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wonders if the essential point is not the importance of gradualness. Neale died disappointed 
if undaunted; Backstrom looks with discouragement on the movement as it enters the 
twentieth century . Both may have been unnecessarily harsh. Neale's thought, often unack-
nowledged, did spread elsewhere with important results; many new types of co-operative 
activity have appeared and flourished; and there has been remarkable growth nearly 
everywhere but in Great Britain . One can even argue a case for the emergence during 
the twentieth century of a significant international movement with a considerable impact. 
In short, it was highly unrealistic for Neale to expect that his ideas on united diversity could 
bear fruit while he lived; but that does not mean that some of them would not be realized 
with the passage of time. 
Such questions, though, should not detract from the stimulating analysis Backstrom 
has made, an analysis that hopefully will encourage examinations of both old and new 
questions about the history of the British co-operative movement. 
* * * 
Ian MACPHERSON, 
University of Winnipeg . 
DAVID BLEAKLEY. -Faulkner : Conflict and Consent in Irish Politics . London & 
Oxford: Mowbrays, 1974. 
When Brian Faulkner became prime mm1ster of Northern Ireland in March 1971, 
he acquired a place in history which entitled him to a political biography . This has 
been supplied by David Bleakley, a member of the Northern Irish Labour party, who 
joined his coalition government and consequently was qualified by experience to provide 
a critical but sympathetic treatment of Faulkner and his administration . More important, 
Bleakley's sense of history enables him to supply a useful comment on the forces at work 
in Northern Ireland in the 1970's. 
Faulkner, like his predecessor, Captain Terence O'Neill, was a conventional political 
leader at an unconventional point in history. O'Neill had responded imaginatively, grasping 
for a compromise and, in doing so , lost the confidence of the Protestant Unionists on 
which his power was based. Faulkner faced the same problem that had defeated O'Neill, 
that of reconciling the "Catholic" and "Orange" communities of Ulster. In Bleakley's 
opinion, O'Neill's effectiveness was blunted by his aristocratic background and English 
accent. Faulkner had less obvious establishment connections. Coming from a wealthy 
Presbyterian family, he was educated at St. Columba's College , Rathfarnham , a famous 
public school outside Dublin where he became a friend of the son of William Butler Yeats, 
now speaker of the Irish Senate. After a year at Queen's University as a law student, 
Faulkner entered the family business in 1940 and remained a successful businessmen until 
1%0. His love of horses, common to most Irishmen, and his enthusiasm for the Hunt, 
undoubtedly helped balance the political disadvantages of not having served during the 
war. 
Faulkner made his way with difficulty in the Unionist Party, building his strength 
by close connections with the Orange Order, and convincing the average Orangeman that 
he felt and thought as they did . His intention was to use the confidence which he had 
built up over the years to create a system in which the Orange and Catholic communities 
could be equal partners in Northern Ireland. Like O'Neill, his approach was imaginative, 
inviting labour participation that included David Bleakley into his government. In the 
spring of 1971 , it appeared that he would succeed. 
The difficulty was the intensification of terrorism in the summer of 1971. Bleakley 
believes that Faulkner's decision to accept the advice of the security forces to intern 
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suspected terrorists was a mistake . It certainly lost him the confidence that he was begin-
ning to win in the Catholic community , and did not bring the LR.A . under control. Yet 
it is difficult to see how he could have retained the confidence of protestant Ulster if he 
neglected to take what seemed obvious measures against terrorism. 
After continued terrorism led to direct rule from London , Faulkner was able to 
regain much of the ground he had lost, and again became chief of a re-constructed govern-
ment of Northern Ireland in December 1973. The essence of his policy was full rights for the 
Catholic minority in the Six Counties while postponing indefinitely the question of union 
with the south. It did not provide the much desired political solution to terrorism. North 
Irish candidates supporting Faulkner were defeated in the Westminster election of March 
1974 , and Faulkner resigned when faced with the protestant-inspired general strike in May . 
The story, well told by Bleakley , is supported by a useful appendix of Faulkner's 
writings and speeches . The author clearly believes that Faulkner deserved to succeed 
and seems to suggest that he is the once and future leader of Northern Ireland. Yet Faulkner 
remains a conventional political figure, preaching compromise, while the terms of the LR.A. 
are "unconditional surrender''. Although the Orange community prefers conventional 
leaders, and it may be doubted that O'Neill's aristocratic background was a real handicap, 
where questions affecting the security of the protestant community are concerned , Orange-
men will tum to extremists or act spontaneously under local leaders. Faulkner perhaps 
understands this, and that is why he remains an influential leader among the fragmented 
Unionists today. 
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